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TRIPS AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN AN AGE OF
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY
Michael L. Doane*

INTRODUCTION
Over the last 25 years, the international marketplace has witnessed the
growing presence of high technology products and the development of
new forms of technology.' Technology-based industries manufacturing
products ranging from computers, semiconductors, and software to
biotechnology goods and pharmaceuticals have become an increasingly
vital sector of the U.S. economy. As a result, a large portion of American exports are high technology products and related services. Estimates
place the international trade of such products at as much as five percent
of the U.S. Gross National Product.2
An important factor in the development of the United States as the
world's leading technological innovator is its strong protection of intellectual property rights. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the international protection of intellectual property rights through either multilateral
or bilateral negotiations occupies an important position on the U.S.
agenda for proposed reforms of the international trading system. The
United States is a major producer and exporter of copyrighted materials
as well as high technology products. In 1989, copyrighted materials
accounted for $173 billion in U.S. sales and $22 billion in foreign exports.' Furthermore, numerous American products are identified by well-

* L.L.M., 1994, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1990, University of Washington School of Law; M.A.I.S., 1990, Jackson School of International Studies; B.A.,
1986, Kent State University. The author wishes to thank Professor Don Wallace, Jr. for his
advice in the preparation of this Article.
1. Doriane Lambelet, Internationalizing the Copyright Code; An Analysis of Legislative Proposals Seeking Adherence to the Berne Convention, 76 GEO. L.J. 467, 470

(1987).
2.
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THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A

A STUDY OF COMPUTER SOFTwARE 4 (1992).
Hearing on International Piracy of Intellectual Property Before the Subcomm.

WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS,
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known and respected trademarks. Consequently, American businesses,
artists, and scientists stand to suffer considerably from the piracy that
results from the inadequate protection of intellectual property rights
abroad. It is estimated that worldwide losses to U.S. industries from
piracy and other forms of intellectual property right infringement exceed
$60 billion annually.4
During the 1980s, the United States responded to the problem of
inadequate intellectual property protection through a variety of domestic
and international actions. Congress moved to strengthen actions taken
under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and created the Super 301
and Special 301 actions.' The Reagan and Bush Administrations negotiated bilaterally and multilaterally in order to obtain adequate intellectual
property protection abroad.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
Due to the persistence of the U.S. business community and government, international intellectual property rights protection was placed on
the negotiating agenda for the Uruguay Round of Negotiations of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The mere inclusion
of intellectual property rights on the agenda remains controversial and
many developing countries contend that it exceeds the limitations of the
GATT's mandate The United States asserts that inadequate intellectual
property protection leads to trade distortions and the impairment of
concessions due to intellectual property piracy which amounts to a non-

on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (Sept. 29, 1992) (statement of Eric H. Smith, Executive Director and General
Counsel, Intellectual Property Alliance).
4. See Report to the United States Trade Representative, Foreign Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, USITC Pub.
2065 (1988) (studying the economic effects of inadequate international protection of
intellectual property and concluding that the sales of infringing goods may represent
an average profit of ten percent).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
6. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1176-79, § 1302 (1989).
7. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Punta del Este, reprinted in
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCuMENTS 19, 25 (33d Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
Ministerial Declaration].
8. GATT Negotiating Group Sets Talks This Week On U.S. Proposal, WIPO Will
Join Discussion, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1358 (Nov. 4, 1987) [hereinafter GATT
Negotiating Group].
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tariff trade barrier.9 The consequence of this multilateral debate on intellectual property rights to date is the proposed Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS Agreement or Agreement).'0 This proposed agreement has received mixed reviews from all sides, including some U.S.
analysts who question the value of the TRIPS Agreement in its current
form." Notwithstanding this criticism, the proposed TRIPS Agreement
represents a significant step forward because it mandates the establishment of substantive standards for intellectual property protection and requires mechanisms for the enforcement of rights. It thus provides a
framework for the continued development of international intellectual
property protection.
At this stage of the negotiations, the issue no longer remains whether
increased levels of intellectual property protection will arise, but rather,
what forms the protection will take and how it will evolve. The proposed TRIPS Agreement and the remaining Uruguay Round Agreements
may be rejected, but the United States has made intellectual property
protection a centerpiece of its international trade policy and possesses
several mechanisms with which to pursue that policy. The United States
Trade Representative (USTR), Ambassador Mickey Kantor, recently
stated:
One of my principal responsibilities as USTR is to open foreign markets
and break down barriers to U.S. manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services. This includes pursuing the strong protection of U.S.
intellectual property, so important to our high technology industries. When
all is said and done, opening foreign markets is our main objective in the
Uruguay Round; it is the impetus, from our standpoint, for the North
9. See U.S. Framework Proposal To GATT Concerning Intellectual Property

Rights, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. Framework
Proposal to GAM] (proposing measures to reduce impediments to legitimate trade in
goods and services by increasing enforcement practices and economic deterrents); see
also State Department Program Examines "GATT and Intellectual Property" 31 Pat.

Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 10, 1986) (presenting various views
concerning the means by which the United States could improve intellectual property
protection in foreign markets).
10. See GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1991) [hereinafter The Dunkel Draft]

(outlining the results of the Uruguay Round concerning international protection of
intellectual property).
11.

See U.S. Industry May Not Like GAiT Proposal For Intellectual Property,

Analyst Says, 43 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 221 (Jan. 16, 1992)
(commenting on the basic intellectual property provisions proposed for GATT).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); it will be a principal focus of
our efforts with respect to Japan and China, as well as in other nations
-around the world ... Consequently, we need to use every tool at our
disposal-multilaterally where possible, and bilaterally where necessary-to
make sure that other markets are comparably open to our
2
own.1

The United States continues to pursue intellectual property protection
through regional negotiations as demonstrated by the strong intellectual
property provisions of the NAFTA. In addition, the USTR has aggressively used Special 301 to encourage nations such as Taiwan, Thailand,
and South Korea to improve their intellectual property laws. Even With
a TRIPS Agreement in place, it is unlikely that the United States will
cease negotiating for the further development of intellectual property
protection through regional and bilateral agreements.
Assuming that a TRIPS Agreement enters into force, the international
community will face the problem of adjusting international intellectual
property law to meet changes in technology. The development of new
technology is highly dynamic and the law must be able to advance with
it. The past two decades saw a pragmatic evolution in technology in3
areas such as computer software, semiconductors, and biotechnology.
These areas, however, were inadequately covered by existing forms of
intellectual property protection. This inadequacy prompted debates over
whether to modify existing forms of protection, as with computer software, or create sui generis forms of protection, as with semiconductors.
One stated purpose of the U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round was
to ensure that a mechanism for the advancement and adjustment of
international intellectual property protection is included in any TRIPS
Agreement. 4
Technological advancements and their importance to the world econo-

12. Testimony of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative,
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance (Mar. 9, 1993) (on file with The American
University Journal of International Law and Policy).
13. See Michael Schrage, The Slow, Sorry Disappearance of Venture Capitalism,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1991, at C2 (noting that the fields of biotechnology and computer software are witnessing great technological changes); California Aerospace: Future of Defense (N.P.R. radio broadcast, May 28, 1992) (noting the technological
advances made in the area of semiconductors).
14. See Mark C. Damschroder, Intellectual Property Rights and the GAYT: United
States Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 391 (1988)

(stating that the United States is hoping to increase dramatically copyright protection
through Uruguay Round negotiations).
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my placed intellectual property rights on the Uruguay Round agenda.
This Article will examine the progress made in these negotiations by
analyzing the proposed TRIPS Agreement and comparing it with progress made using other mechanisms like the NAFTA and Special 301
actions. The Article will then consider the place of the GATT in the
continued development and spread of intellectual property law after the
Uruguay Round. Technological advancements have improved both quality of life and the ability of pirates to infringe upon protected intellectual,
property rights. In order to meet the needs of the international marketplace, an effective mechanism for the protection of intellectual property
rights must be established, hopefully multilaterally through the GATT,
or if necessary, through regional and bilateral arrangements.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIPS PROPOSAL

A variety of economic and technological variables initiated the drive
to develop some form of an agreement to address the trade-related aspects of intellectual property. One purpose of intellectual property law is
to provide innovators and investors with an incentive to participate in
creative activity. 5 Because. investors tend to be averse to unreasonable
or excessive risk, absent adequate intellectual property protection, many
investors may shift their investments from intellectual property-dependant
projects to less productive, albeit less risky investments. Intellectual
property protection eliminates some investment risk and provides investors with an economic incentive to finance innovative activity. 6 This
investment, in turn, helps produce and support a prosperous economy. In
an increasingly integrated global economy, intellectual property protection will assume a more vital role as industrialized nations begin to shift
from traditional manufacturing bases to more knowledge-based and research-intensive industries.
Intellectual property piracy is rampant and affects a wide range of
industries." In particular, piracy hurts pharmaceutical industries, indus15. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (stating that copyrights and patents are intended to motivate the creative activity of both authors and inventors); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)
(stating that the purpose of copyright protection is to encourage people to engage in
artistic and intellectual creation).
16. Janet H. MacLaughlin, Timothy J. Richards, & Leigh A. Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CoNFLICT? 101 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds.,
1988).
17. See Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou, Combatting the Pirates of
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tries protected by trademark law, and producers and publishers who rely
on copyright protection (i.e., developers of computer software, creators
of literary and artistic works, and producers of audio and video recordings)." Many nations deny patent protection to pharmaceutical products
which by their nature require considerable time and expense to develop
and bring to market.' Consequently, some pharmaceutical companies
face foreign competitors who misappropriate information with the active
assistance and encouragement of their governments to produce inexpensive and potentially ineffective or dangerous imitations.2' New technology such as digital audio tapes, high quality digital broadcasts, optical
character recognition scanners, and recordable compact discs threaten to
make piracy easier and more difficult to detect."' These technologies
allow pirates to make high quality copies of copyrighted materials at

America's Ideas, 7 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 7, 8 (1990) (noting the extent of the
damage inflicted by copyright piracy on many industries and areas).
18. See id. (noting that the communication and information industries are particularly injured by copyright piracy).
19. See Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, Statement
of Views of the European, Japanese, and United States Business Communities 13
(1988) [hereinafter Basic Framework Proposal] (stating that without effective legal
restrictions, chemists have the ability to reproduce pharmaceutical products in sufficient quality and quantity to eliminate competition from legitimate companies).
20. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of
Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627 (1987) [hereinafter Dam, Growing Importance] (noting that in a number of countries with inadequate proprietary drug protection, local companies produce substandard imitation pharmaceuticals prior to governmental approval of the original formula); see also Al Wyss, Patent Protection Winning New Round: Pharmaceuticals 1990 Special Report, 237 Chem. Marketing Rep.
SR22 (Mar. 19, 1990) (discussing sanctions imposed by the United States against
countries refusing to extend or enforce intellectual property laws to pharmaceutical
patents).
21. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating
Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 132835 (1990), see Michael Skapinker & Nikki Tait, Digital Killed The Audio Star, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 9 (discussing developments in the music and entertainment
industry that allow consumers to receive high quality digital feed into their homes
which may eliminate or reduce the profits of the home video and recording industries
due to pirating by consumers); see also Jason S. Berman, The Music Industry and
Technological Development (Apr. 1,1993) (presented at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Worldwide Symposium on the Impact of Digital Technology
on Copyright and Neighboring Rights) (on file with The American University of International Law and Policy) (noting the problems and issues confronting the entertainment industry and legislatures as a result of digital technology enabling consumers to
pirate compact discs and videos easily).
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minimal cost and effort.22 Inadequate trademark enforcement leads to
the marketing of substandard counterfeit products that are sold in both
foreign markets as well as the trademark owner's home market.23 Trade
distortions resulting from ineffective or nonexistent intellectual property
protection led the United States and other industrialized nations to discuss an international framework for the protection of intellectual property rights.
Proponents introduced the international protection of intellectual property rights to the GATT at the end of the Tokyo Round in the context
of halting the counterfeiting of trademarked goods. Although the parties
reached no agreement, the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC) succeeded in bringing the issue to the attention of
the GATT's contracting parties and submitted a proposed agreement on
measures to inhibit trade in counterfeit goods.24 Actions taken by developing nations at the March 1980 Conference of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) further encouraged industrialized nations
to pursue negotiations under the auspices of the GATT. At the conference, the Group of Developing Countries attempted to weaken the already inadequate standards of protection provided by The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.' Although the industrialized nations blocked this initiative, this action demonstrated both the
futility of seeking broad-based reform in this forum and the need to
pursue other avenues to advance international intellectual property protection.
During various ministerial GATT meetings throughout the early
1980s, members continued discussing the possibility of including the
subject of trade in counterfeit goods on the agenda of the next round of
22. See Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State "Shrink Wrap" License Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV.
222, 225 (1988) (noting the ease and low cost of pirating computer software).
23. Dam, Growing Importance, supra note 20, at 628.
24. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services
in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 64-65
(1987) (stating that, while not a complete success, the U.S. proposal resulted in a
modest work program for trade in services and counterfeit goods); see also Agreement
on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/5382
(Oct. 18, 1982).
25. Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The U.S. Proposal for a GATT Agreement on
Intellectual Property Protection and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 266 (1989) (examining the U.S.
proposal to improve the international protection of intellectual property now afforded
by the Paris Convention).
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negotiations. Developing nations resisted the inclusion of intellectual
property rights, asserting that such a topic exceeded the GATT's mandate. This period also saw greater use of domestic measures to protect
intellectual property rights and to deter trafficking in counterfeit goods.
Such measures included the instigation of Section 301 actions against
nations with inadequate intellectual property protection2 6 and the use of
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which allows the seizure and
destruction of infringing goods at the U.S. border.2 The Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 further strengthened these domestic measures to combat intellectual property infringement more effectively.' These negotiations and aggressive domestic enforcement measures signaled the industrialized nations' determination to include strong
intellectual property protection in the international trading system.
The persistence of the United States and the other industrialized nations was rewarded by the inclusion of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round agenda by the Punta del Este
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round.29 Nations opposing
strong international intellectual property protection continued to resist
these negotiations by insisting that WIPO remained the appropriate fo-

26. See Indonesia Amends Its Copyright Law, East Asian Executive Rep. 7 (Nov.
15, 1987) (stating that in response to a Section 301 action, Indonesia altered its copyright protection); New Opportunities for U.S. Exports Seen as South Korea Liberalizes
Trade Policy, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1552 (Dec. 24, 1986) (reporting that South
Korea pledged to introduce new copyright protection laws in response to two Section
301 cases).
27. See International Trade, USTR Requests $1.6 Million Increase in Authorization for 1990 Budget, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 55 (Mar. 23, 1989)
(noting the increase in the number of Section 337 actions during the late 1980s).
28. Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415 (1988) (amending section 32(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78ff(c)).
29. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 7, at 25. The declaration stated:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote the effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and
to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade,
the negotiations shall aim to clarify GAT'T provisions and elaborate
as appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in
the GATT.
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rum for such a topic. This resistance ceased when WIPO's DirectorGeneral was specifically mandated to participate in the GATT intellectual property negotiations. 3' Further opposition to substantive TRIPS
negotiations ended when India agreed to accept "the principle of policing trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights within the framework of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations.' With this
obstacle eliminated, substantive proposals could be considered.
The Governments and business communities of the United States,
Japan, and the European Community submitted proposals stating basic
objectives and outlining specific substantive requirements for a TRIPS
Agreement. These proposals revealed the specific concerns and areas of
common agreement of these parties. In general, the proposals contained
several basic requirements, including the development of substantive
standards, strong enforcement mechanisms, a strengthened dispute resolution system, and the application of traditional GATT obligations such
as national treatment, transparency, and most favored nation treatment,
to any intellectual property regime.32
As part of its proposal, the United States announced that its objective
in these negotiations was "to reduce distortions and impediments to
legitimate trade in goods and services caused by deficient levels of
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights."'33 To achieve
this objective, the U.S. proposal included basic standards for patents,
copyrights and trademarks generally found in its domestic intellectual
property laws.' It also specifically addressed two controversial elements of many developing nations' patent laws: short patent terms and
compulsory licensing.35 The proposal provided for a patent term of
twenty years from the time patent protection was sought or seventeen

30. GATT Negotiating Group, supra note 8, at 1358.
31. India Accepts Policing of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights in MTN
Talks, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 244 (Sept. 20, 1989) (noting that India previously
asserted .that the responsibility for protecting intellectual property belonged to the
WIPO). India's recognition of the importance of intellectual property protection in the
GATT was seen as a retreat from their original hard-line position, thereby presenting
an opportunity for continued negotiations. Id.
32. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Meier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 291
(1989) (outlining the four basic elements of the envisioned GATT accord of intellectual property).
33. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1371.
34. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
35. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
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years from the date the patent was granted.36 The U.S. proposal also
discouraged compulsory licensing and required full compensation and
non-exclusivity for such licenses.37 The rest of the industrialized nations
found these elements of the U.S. proposal and its suggestions concerning
the protection of copyrights and trademarks generally acceptable.
The U.S. proposal also addressed new technologies. The proposal
explicitly extended copyright protection to "computer programs and
databases, and to forms yet to be developed."3 Furthermore, the United
States proposed establishing a sui generis system for semiconductor chip
layout design protection.39 This concern for a flexible system of international intellectual property protection to cover new technologies played
an important role in the U.S. proposal. For example, the proposal recognized that:
Forms of technologies and creative activity change and develop over time.
The Agreement must be a living document, and flexible enough to accommodate future consensus on improved protection of intellectual property and to include new forms of technology and creativity as they appear.
The mechanism for amendment and revision of the Agreement should be
designed to encourage future improvements of the Agreement.
Technological innovation stretches the limits of intellectual property
protection as it currently exists. This portion of the U.S. proposal ensured that the development of a TRIPS Agreement would take such
innovations into consideration.
The Europeans and Japanese responded with less detailed, yet significant, proposals for the TRIPS negotiations. The initial European proposal lacked any statement concerning substantive standards, but did suggest
national enforcement provisions. In addition, the EEC noted its general
concerns regarding international intellectual property protection, suggesting that current GATT provisions inadequately resolved the problems
found in the field of intellectual property rights.4' The EEC later submitted another proposal regarding substantive standards including measures relating to geographic indications and appellations of origin.42
36. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
37. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
38. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
39. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1373.
40. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT, supra note 9, at 1372.
41. Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on
Trade-Related
Aspects
of
Intellectual
Property Rights,
GAT'
Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16 (Nov. 20, 1987).
42. Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Community for the
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The Japanese proposal addressed the difficulties in protecting semiconductor chips and expressed the need to maintain traditional GATT
principles in a TRIPS Agreement. The Japanese and other parties also
expressed concern about the future role of mechanisms for the enforcement of international intellectual property rights such as the U.S.
Special 301 action. 3 While many of these proposals' differences represent minor debates in the field of intellectual property law that can be
resolved during negotiations, other differences will require extensive discussion and compromise to reach mutually satisfying results.
Supplementing each of their Government's proposals, the business
communities of the United States, Japan, and the European Community
submitted a substantial joint proposal to the TRIPS Agreement negotiators." The substantive standards proposed by the business groups represented a compromise between the industrialized nations' intellectual
property laws and the governments' proposals. The business
communities' proposal also gave in-depth consideration to compulsory
licensing and working requirements, stating that failure to work a patent
in a particular nation should not be grounds for revocation and that
"importation authorized by the patentee which meets local need shall be
deemed to satisfy the requirements for working."45 The business communities also suggested several incentives such as enhanced access to
technology, bilateral economic assistance, and technical assistance, to
encourage developing nations to join a GATT intellectual property
code. 6 Notwithstanding the receptive attitude, the business groups also
suggested that industrialized nations condition access to their markets
and the availability of general preferences on adequate intellectual
property protection.47 The cooperation of the various business communities in the production and submission of such an extensive and detailed
joint proposal further demonstrated the importance of intellectual proper-

Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Property Rights, GATr Doe. MTN.GNG/NGII/W/26 (July 7, 1988).
43. See Mitsod Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 81, 89-91 (1992) (noting that the permissibility of unilateral action is of great concern to all nations).
44. See Basic Framework Proposal supra note 19 (containing recommendations
from the business communities of the United States, Japan, and the European Community).
45. Basic Framework Proposal, supra note 19, at 32.
46. See Basic Framework Proposal, supra note 19, at 28 (discussing several incentive plans).
47. Basic Framework Proposal, supra note 19, at 28.
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ty protection to international trade.
The process of negotiating the proposed TRIPS Agreement has proven
to be long and difficult. The objective of eliminating trade distortions
caused by inadequate international intellectual propery protection, however, will continue to guide future negotiations. The industrialized nations recognize their common economic and political interests in developing some form of international intellectual property protection and
further recognize that:
[T]rade with technology constitutes a decisive pillar of the future competitiveness of research-oriented countries like the U.S. and the EC member
states. Consequently, it appears as an absolute necessity to adequately
protect the results of research and development achieved after heavy investments. 8
With the establishment of a TRIPS Agreement, the negotiations enter a
new stage. Although problems and disagreements remain, a framework
now exists for the continued development of the international protection
of intellectual property rights.
IlI.

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

In order to advance the negotiations in all the areas covered by the
Uruguay Round, the GATT Director-General issued The Dunkel Draft as
a comprehensive statement of the status of the negotiations. The Director-General presented this document as an all or nothing agreement
designed to prevent parties from splitting off sections to be adopted
separately.49 This requirement proved to be useful in obtaining a TRIPS
Agreement, as the United States and other industrialized nations could
combine concessions sought by developing nations in such areas as agriculture and textiles to the achievement of an adequate TRIPS Agreement." The proposed TRIPS Agreement represents a compromise;
though, and therefore receives much criticism. Although the proposed
TRIPS Agreement has strengths and weaknesses, it nonetheless repre-

48. See Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg Symposium, GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property 24 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989) (quoting the remarks of
Mr. Emory Simon).
49. Mid-April Deadline Set For Talks-TRIPS Document Gets Poor Reviews, 6
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 41, 41 (1992).
50. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Uruguay Round: Where Are We?, 25
INT'L LAW. 723, 729 (1991).
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sents an important first step in obtaining effective international intellectual property protection.
The comprehensive TRIPS proposal covers the spectrum of intellectual property protection by providing minimum substantive standards, mandated national enforcement mechanisms, and international dispute settlement provisions.5' The proposal includes the traditional GATT re-

quirements of national treatment and most favored nation treatment with
some exceptions." For example, the nature of the national treatment
concept in the context of intellectual property varies from the traditional
understanding of GATT's national treatment conception.53 Questions of
national treatment presented problems for negotiators and caused opponents to raise objections against the TRIPS Agreement, particularly in
the area of copyright regulations. The question of national treatment,
however, represents only one of the criticisms leveled at the Agreement.
To evaluate the Trips Agreement adequately, it is necessary that the
international community first analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
the work as a whole before passing judgment.
A.

PATENTS

The establishment of strong patent protection is of primary importance
to the U.S. high technology industry. The proposed TRIPS Agreement
provides minimum standards which closely match the initial proposal of
the United States. In fact, some nations have complained that the proposed TRIPS Agreement favors U.S. interests too heavily.54 The patent
section provides a twenty-year term of protection from time of filing
and defines patentable subject matter as any invention, whether product
or process, that is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of

51. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Annex III), GATT Doe. MTN/FA IIAIC (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
52. Id., art. 3-4.
53. David Hartridge & Arrind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The
Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 898-99 (1989). For example,
[Tihere is an important distinction between the subject matter of the national'
treatment rule in the GATr and that in intellectual property conventions. The
GATT relates to products. The rule in intellectual propertyconventions concerns
persons; each member state must accord nationals of other member states the
same protection or treatment as it accords its own nationals.
Id.
54. GATT Proposal Receives Mixed Reviews in U.S. and Canada, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 29 (1992).
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industrial application. 5 Furthermore, the draft notes that "inventive
step" and "capable of industrial application" should be considered synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" as commonly used in
U.S. patent law. 6 The draft further strengthens the patent right by prohibiting patent discrimination based on the place of invention, ,the field
of technology, or whether the product is imported or domestically produced.57 This language seeks to address problems common to the patent
systems of many developing nations such as local working requirements
and the exclusion of specific products, like pharmaceuticals and
agrichemicals, from protection. This section represents a significant step
towards establishing basic patent standards in international law.
Although the patent section provides a solid foundation for developing
international patent protection, some problems exist. For example, the
exclusions to patentable subject matter contained in Article 27, Paragraphs 2 and 3 could be abused. Article 27 recognizes the following
grounds for exclusion: (1) protecting ordre public or morality; (2) protecting human, plant or animal life or health; and (3) avoiding serious
prejudice to the environment." These exclusions are very broad and
without a narrowing interpretation or interpretative statement, they could
be understood to allow the continued exclusion of certain pharmaceutical
products and processes from patentability.59 Nations may also exclude
from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods, as well
as certain plants, animals, and biological processes for the production of
plants or animals.' In effect, such language substantially limits protection for the growing biotechnology industry.
The lack of pipeline protection in the patent section also particularly
affects the pharmaceutical industry. Pipeline protection requires the nations that would for the first time provide patent protection to
pharmaceuticals and agrichemicals to extend this protection to such
products already patented in other nations for the remainder of their

55. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 27.1.
56. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, at 13 & n.5.
57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 27.1.
58. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 27.2.
59. Jacques Gorlin, Improving Intellectual Property Protection, SCRIP MAG. 36,
37 (Mar. 1993); See Report of the Industry Functional Advisory Committee for Trade
in Intellectual Property Rights on the North American Free Trade Agreement, in THE
REPORTS OF THE FUNCTIONAL AND SECTORAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 16-17 (1992)
[hereinafter IFAC-3] (discussing exceptions to subject matter patentability in NAFTA).
60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 27.3.
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patent terms.6' Article 70, Paragraph 8 of the proposed TRIPS Agreement fails to provide for such protection.62 A possible solution to this
problem would be to provide early commercial advantages to the pharmaceutical patent holder through some form of exclusive marketing
arrangement. 3 Nevertheless, pipeline protection remains a great concern
to the pharmaceutical industry' 4 and is included in the intellectual property provisions of NAFTA.65 Intellectual property interests must, however, remember that a balancing of interests will be required to establish
a workable and acceptable TRIPS Agreement.
The proposed TRIPS Agreement effectively addresses the problem of
compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing is not specifically banned,
but nations wishing to issue such licenses must satisfy important conditions.' These conditions include the payment of adequate remuneration,
non-exclusivity, non-assignability, limited duration and scope, and the
requirement that a compulsory license only be used after the prospective
licensee has tried to obtain authorization from the right's holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.67 Moreover, limitations on
the use of compulsory licenses for the exploitation of dependent patents
also exist.68 The language of Articles 27 and 31 states that local working requirements for compulsory licensing purposes remain satisfied
through the importation of patented products sufficient to meet local
needs. 9 Such language is necessary to avoid requiring a patent holder
to produce the product in every jurisdiction where it is patented or face
a compulsory license. With certain exceptions, the substantive standards
of the patent section and the compulsory licensing provisions provide a
useful starting point for the further development and advancement of

61. IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 17.
62. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 70.8.
63. Gorlin, supra note 59, at 37-38.
64. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 6 (suggesting that the United States seek the
inclusion of NAFTA provisions in the final GATT TRIPS text).
65. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 17 (stating that NAFTA provides pipeline
protection and is a considerable improvement compared to the Dunkel text); see also
Gorlin, supra note 59, at 38 (declaring that IFAC-3 believes "the NAFTA intellectual
property provisions represent the highest standards of protection and enforcement so
far achieved by United States negotiators").
66. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 31.
67. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 31.
68. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 31(e). A dependent patent is a patent
on an improvement to an invention within the scope of an earlier dominant patent.
Id.
69. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51,, arts. 27, 31.
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international patent protection.

B.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyright protection is a particularly important aspect of the TRIPS
Agreement due to advances in technology that have made copyright infringement significantly easier and less expensive. The copyright and
related rights provisions of the proposed TRIPS Agreement generally
codify traditional copyright standards by requiring a minimum fifty-year
term as well as compliance with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of
The Berne Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(1971).70 This framework does not include provisions relating to moral
rights.7 Copyright protection is extended to compilations of data and
databases and to computer software which is treated as a literary
work.72 Sound recordings also receive increased protection.
The primary area of conflict in the copyright and related rights provisions involves the role of national treatment. Many nations read their
national treatment obligations narrowly thereby denying certain benefits
to foreign nationals. These nations create what they consider to be new
rights or subject matters and then assert that their national treatment
obligation under copyright and neighboring rights agreements does not
extend to such new areas. 3 The most controversial example of this
practice is the European video levy system which collects and distributes
funds to compensate copyright holders for private copying. 4 While authors, performers, and video producers receive the levy funds, foreign
video producers are denied their fair shares because video producers are
not specifically covered by any agreement with a national treatment
obligation.75 Advances in technology such as digital broadcasting make
it likely that similar regimes will be developed with the potential to
generate billions of dollars in revenue. 6 Consequently, American businesses with copyright and related rights interests stand to lose substantial

70. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 9, 12.
71. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 9.
72. Trips Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10.
73. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 12 (indicating that nations use these rights to
justify the denial of payments to foreign rights owners).
74. IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 12.
75. IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 12.
76. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 11 (stating that the denial of national treatment could deprive a nation of billions of dollars and discourage industrial growth,
productivity, and development).
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revenue if national treatment concepts are not further extended in the
realm of copyright and neighboring rights.'
C.

TRANSITION PERIODS

The issue of transition periods is an area of concern in both the patent and copyright provisions. It is asserted that developing nations need
time to adjust their economies and legal systems to meet the requirements of the proposed TRIPS Agreement. It is unclear, however, that
transition periods need be as long as provided in Articles 65 and 66.
The proposed transition period allows one year with a four-year extension for developing countries and those nations shifting from a centrally
planned economy to a market economy." Furthermore, an additional
extension period of five years is granted for developing nations providing patent protection to areas not previously covered by their patent
regimes, such as pharmaceuticals and agrichemicals."
Due to the fast pace of technological development, this extended transition period is extremely burdensome to high technology industries and
other creative or research-oriented industries. It is also possible that the
transition period may inhibit the use of Special 301 against signatory
nations for the duration of the transition. Former General Counsel for
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Joshua
Bolten, testified before Congress that the moral authority to use Special
301 might be constrained under an agreement that allows nations long
transition periods."0 Excessive transition periods merely allow nations
with thriving pirate industries to continue operating to the detriment of
foreign and domestic innovators. Furthermore, long transition periods
unnecessarily delay the development of such nations' economies and
their further integration into the international marketplace. Therefore,
shorter transition periods would be in the interests of the United States
and the other industrialized nations.

D. NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
Along with the establishment of substantive standards fqr patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property, the

77.
78.
79.
80.

IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 11.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 65.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 65.
Proposed TRIPS Text Would Limit Use of Special 301, USTR Counsel Says,

6 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 102, 102 (1992).

482

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:2

proposed TRIPS Agreement also requires the creation of effective national enforcement measures for rights holders. The proposal provides
for both internal and border enforcement measures. Although it does not
require a signatory state to create an entirely new or separate judicial
system for intellectual property rights,8' the Agreement does mandate
certain minimal obligations. The proposal requires a signatory nation to:
[E]nsure that enforcement procedures, as specified in this Part, are available under their national laws so as to permit effective action against any
act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.'
Specific requirements include fair and equitable procedures; 3 decisions
must be on the merits, reasoned, in writing, and made available to the
parties;" judicial authorities must be able to grant injunctions, award
damages for infringement, and order that infringing goods be destroyed;85 and decisions are to be based only on evidence on which
parties had the opportunity to be heard. 6 The TRIPS Agreement also
mandates the creation of a mechanism which enables a right holder to
block the importation of infringing products. 7
Intellectual property rights are useless without adequate enforcement
provisions. The United States demonstrated the importance of enforcement when it used the threat of a Special 301 action to convince
Thailand to enforce its otherwise adequate copyright laws. Once substantive standards exist, the development of workable and effective national
enforcement mechanisms may become the primary issue in international
intellectual property protection. The United States listed the establishment of effective national enforcement measures as one of its requirements in its initial proposal. Many developing countries object to the
mere fact that national enforcement measures, and internal enforcement
measures in particular, appear in the proposed TRIPS Agreement.88

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 41.5.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 41.1.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 42.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 41.3.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 44-46.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 41.3.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 44.
See Daniel Gamer, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round, 3 INT'L LE-
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Clearly, this area will continue to be a major area of dispute even if the
parties accept the TRIPS proposal.

E. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
In addition to providing for current forms of technology and intellectual property protection, the negotiators of the proposed TRIPS Agreement heeded the suggestion by the United States of maintaining a flexible agreement capable of adjusting to the continuing dramatic advances
in technological innovation. Accordingly, copyright protection was extended to cover computer software89 and a sui generis system for the
protection of semiconductor chips was created. The proposed agreement
provides for a ten-year term of protection and requires the parties to
declare unlawful:
[I]mporting, selling, or otherwise distributing for commercial purposes a
protected layout-design, an integrated circuit in which a protected layoutdesign is incorporated, or an article incorporating such an integrated circuit only insofar as it continues to contain an unlawfully reproduced layout design.'

The use of these two different methods of protecting new innovations
and the growing acceptance of this protection for these new technologies
demonstrates the need for an ongoing mechanism for the adjustment of
international intellectual property protection to meet new technological
realities.
The initial U.S. proposal to the TRIPS negotiations included an express statement concerning the effect of new technologies on intellectual
property protection and the need to prepare for further unique innovations not effectively covered by existing regimes. Because technology is
dynamic, a static and rigid agreement would eventually become useless.
Consequently, the proposed TRIPS Agreement provides for a review of
the agreement after the expiration of the initial one-year transition period
and every two years thereafter.9 The proposal further states that the
parties may undertake further reviews in light of any developments
which warrant modification or amendment of the Agreement.92 Al-

GAL PERSP. 51, 75 (1990) (noting that
national enforcement in its proposal).
89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51,
90. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51,
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51,
92. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51,

the United States included mechanisms for
art.
art.
art.
art.

10.
36.
71.1.
71.1.
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though this is merely a general statement of authority to negotiate for
the alteration of current forms of protection or the creation of new sui
generis forms of protection to cover new technology, the provision recognizes the need for flexibility in an agreement of this nature and provides an international forum to address such issues.
The proposed TRIPS Agreement is an important step towards attaining strong international intellectual property protection. As is the case
with most compromise agreements, it has received a wide range of criticism from all sides of the negotiations. As noted, however, by Ambassador Yerxa, the chief U.S. negotiator in the Uruguay Round, such talks
will never produce a result that any government considers perfect. 93 At
the same time, however, the establishment of international standards for
intellectual property protection with effective enforcement mecha'nisms
and access to the GATT's dispute resolution mechanism constitutes a
significant advance. Even if the United States can resolve some of the
problems with the text and bring a TRIPS Agreement into force, it will
still face the problems of bringing other nations into the system and
ensuring that international intellectual property protection evolves with
technology. While a TRIPS Agreement would provide an international
foundation for addressing these problems, the United States still has
other mechanisms available to pursue its interests. Nonetheless, the proposed TRIPS Agreement is a significant contribution to the development
of international intellectual property protection.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION

The implementation of a TRIPS Agreement will not be the end of the
process of establishing an international intellectual property regime, but
merely the beginning. Many questions remain concerning how this implementation will proceed and what role other international organizations
such as WIPO, other international fora including regional and bilateral
negotiations, and mechanisms such as Special 301 will play in this
process. Moreover, their roles must be considered not only in the implementation, but in the evolution of international intellectual property
protection.
After the Uruguay Round, a TRIPS Agreement will provide a floor
for intellectual property protection below which no contracting party

93. GATT Proposal Receives Mixed Reviews in U.S. and Canada, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 29 (1992).
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may fall. The Agreement will also establish a multilateral forum for
negotiations concerning modifications required by technological advancements.. Contracting parties may, in addition, wish to use other fora and
mechanisms to encourage and negotiate for intellectual property protection beyond the requirements of a TRIPS Agreement. The interplay
between negotiations under the auspices of the GATT, WIPO, and regional and bilateral talks such as those concerning NAFTA has already
achieved advances in international intellectual property protection. How
the international community uses the available fora to address the continued worldwide expansion of intellectual property protection to meet
the needs of new technology will have significant influence in global
marketplace.
As a new form of technology, the printing press once compelled
governments to develop copyright rules as a means of protecting intellectual property.94 Technological innovations continue to exceed the
conceptualizations of intellectual property law. In response to technological innovation, a more evolved body of intellectual property law will by
necessity first originate in the domestic legal systems and later be incorporated into international law through negotiation. The development
process of new intellectual property law, however, may affect its international acceptance, incorporation, and implementation. As noted above,
two schools of thought generally. dominate the understanding of intellectual property right development. The first argues for the modification of
existing forms of intellectual property rights such as patents and copyrights to cover new technologies; the other asserts that sui generis protection for such technology is more efficient. The debates concerning the
extension of protection to computer software and semiconductor chips
clearly illustrate both sides of this dispute.
Copyright protection was extended to computer software only after
considerable debate as to the nature of software. Traditionally, copyright
only protects expression; it does not protect utilitarian subject matter.95
Computer software is utilitarian in nature in that its purpose is to cause

94. See Mary L. Mills, Note, New Technology and the Limitations of. Copyright
Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of
Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 312 (1989) (stating that the
ability to produce mass numbers of copies encourages producers to pirate books for
resale).
95. See Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473
(1985) (stating that copyright law has not traditionally extended protection to utilitari-

an works).
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a computer to perform certain desired functions. Moreover, when in
machine-usable form, software cannot be read by humans. On the other
hand, computer programs are basically creative writings and through the
process of decompiling can be made readable.96 Consequently, Congress
extended copyright protection to computer software and the federal
courts undertook the job of developing guidelines for this protection.
The law is still developing while courts attempt to determine the
necessary extent of protection. Courts have ruled that in certain circumstances, "substantial similarity" is sufficient to qualify as infringement.97
Additionally, courts are considering whether the user interfaces or the
"look and feel" of software is copyrightable. 8 Similar debates have occurred in the EEC and Japan with both eventually extending copyright
protection to computer software." Japan has also taken the unique step
of granting patents for algorithms, the basic building blocks of computer
programs; a step some argue the United States should take."° Although these debates continue, it is now generally accepted and included

96. Questions Concerning a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, 1st Sess.,
BCD/CE/112 3 (1991) (WIPO. Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works) [hereinafter Protocol to the Berne Convention].
97. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325
(E.D. Pa. 1985), af'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987) (finding that a copyright violation existed when the structural aspects of a
computer program were copied, even with the absence of copying the program code);
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Colnputer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977,
993-1013 (1993) (stating that the Court extends copyright protection to non-literal elements and thereby promotes the idea-expression standard).
98. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (discussing the "look and feel" aspects of copyright protection); Gates
Rubber Co. v. Ron Neuman, 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992).
99. See Alan K. Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal
Protection of Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 2 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 65, 78 (1992) (stating that on May 14, 1991, the European
Community (EC) adopted the Software Directive which will provide protective rights
to computer program owners); Osamu Hirakawa & Kenichi Nakano, Copyright Protection of Computer "Interfaces" in Japan, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 46, 46 (1990)
(noting that the 1989 Amendments to Japan's copyright laws set up statutory regulations affecting computer programs).
100. See Garner, supra note 88, at 61 (indicating that the United States is following Japanese patent law by granting patents for innovative programs based on new
algorithms); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitr. L. REv.
959, 1020 (1986) (suggesting that a legal analysis of algorithms, the backbone of
computer programs, reveals reasons that algorithms can be covered under patent laws).
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in the proposed TRIPS Agreement that computer software will be protected by copyright.''
Sui generis protection was chosen as the preferential mode of protection for semiconductor chips for a variety of reasons. Copyright concepts failed to cover semiconductor chips and their mask designs due to
their utilitarian nature. Patent law appeared an unacceptable alternative
because the creativity involved in developing semiconductor chip layouts
and mask designs does not reach the level of inventiveness required for
patent protection. Congress, therefore, chose to create a sui generis form
of protection with the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.12
The act represents a balancing of interests that gives protection to the
designers of semiconductor chip layout designs, but limits the term of
protection to ten years. By establishing a new form of intellectual property protection, the United States set a precedent for the international
community. The act not only protects semiconductor chips, it also includes a reciprocity clause that requires other nations to grant the same
or similar protection in order for their chips to receive the benefits of
protection in the United States.0 3 This reciprocity requirement inspired
such nations as Japan to rapidly develop similar forms of protection for
semiconductor chips. Additionally, it led to the drafting of a Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,"° which is incorporated by reference into the proposed TRIPS Agreement.
These two methods of addressing ongoing technological advances will
play a continuing role in the-development of international intellectual
property protection. As innovators create new technologies and problems
for intellectual property law, domestic legal systems will have to re-

101. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10.
102. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. 11 1984), Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, Title III, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984).
103. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 914 (Supp. H 1984), Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, Title III, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (stating that under
Section 902(a), in order to qualify for reciprocal treatment, a nation must either be a
party to a treaty created to protect computer designs or the President must extend the
benefits directly to that nation). Furthermore, under Section 914, a nation receives this
protection only for a temporary period of time. Id. See also Jay A. Erstling, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act and Its Impact on the International Protection of
Chip Designs, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 303, 321 (1989) (noting that
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland are entitled to reciprocal protection).
104. Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989).
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spond with new forms of protection. With the increasing importance of
the international marketplace, governments will need to extend this protection globally through one of the international intellectual property
protection mechanisms.
The United States achieved some success in this process through the
GATT TRIPS negotiations, and to a lesser extent, in WIPO with the
acceptance of copyright protection for software and sui generis protection for semiconductor chips. The United States was less successful in
attempting to gain international patent protection for biotechnology products through the TRIPS negotiations and other international fora. 5 In
order to ensure the continued evolution of intellectual property law to
meet the needs of new technology and to pursue the spread of intellectual property protection to all nations after the completion of the Uruguay Round and the ratification of a TRIPS Agreement, the United
States must use all international fora available including, but not limited
to, the .GATT.
The decision to include trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights in the Uruguay Round negotiations stimulated activity in a variety
of sectors, particularly in WIPO. The TRIPS negotiations inspired discussions aimed at improving the WIPO dispute resolution system."
The lack of an adequate dispute resolution system was a primary reason
for pursuing intellectual property protection under the GATT. 7 The

105. See Richard L. Berne, Clinton Supports Two Major Steps for the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1993, at Al (revealing that the proposed Biodiversity
Treaty would arguably require biotechnology firms to share research with developing
countries, thereby weakening patent protection). For this reason, President Bush refused to sign the Biodiversity Treaty. Id. President Clinton, however, stated that he
would sign the treaty if an interpretive statement protecting patent rights was accepted
and attached. The United States signed the treaty in June 1993. Id. See also PTO,
Biotech Group Explain Objection to Earth Summit Biodiversity Treaty, 6 World Intell.
Prop. Rep. (BNA) 192-93 (1992) (explaining that the United States rejected the
Biodiversity Treaty because of its inadequate treatment of biotechnology); U.S. Reverses Bush's Rejection of Environmental Pact, L.A. TIMES, June 5. 1993, at 20 (stating that the signing of the Biodiversity Treaty illustrated Clinton's commitment to
treating environmental threats as seriously as security threats).
106. See Susan Wagner, WIPO Focuses on Bold Program to Settle Disputes, Harmonize Laws, 3 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 109 (1989) (stating that GATT's
efforts to police the piracy and counterfeiting of protected materials prompted WIPO
to create new procedures for dispute resolution).
107. See id. (explaining that WIPO proposed to form a Committee of Experts to
hear disputes between States and private parties); WIPO's Dispute Resolution Talks
Highlight Conflicts With GATT, 4 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 78, 78 (1990)
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GATT served as a model for some of the proposals concerning a new
WIPO dispute resolution system.' In addition to negotiating for a
more effective dispute resolution system, WIPO participated in the process of adjusting intellectual property law to meet the problems raised
by computer software, semiconductor chips, and other new technologies.
A WIPO memorandum recognizes that:
[T]here are certain questions in respect of which professional circles have
no uniform views and, what is of particular concern in international relations, even governments which legislated or plan to legislate on such
questions seem to interpret their obligations under the Berne Convention
differently. Such discrepancies in- views already surfaced, or are likely to
surface in the near future, in respect of certain subject matters of protection (e.g., computer programs, phonograms, computer-generated
works) . .. 109
Discussions were initiated to determine whether copyright protection
should be extended to computer software, and after much negotiation, a
draft treaty for the protection of semiconductor chips was proposed. To
this extent, the TRIPS negotiations have proven successful in generating
productive activity in WIPO.
Since its accession to the Berne Convention, the United States has
become active in negotiations for a protocol to the Berne Convention.
This protocol was initially intended to include protection for computer
software, databases, artificial intelligence, computer-produced works, and
sound recordings." ° Of these areas, sound recordings in particular have
attracted a great deal of attention. The WIPO Secretariat was mandated
to draft a model law to address questions concerning the rights of sound
recording producers as well as possible protection against new methods
of piracy."' New technologies like digital audio tapes and digital

(indicating that the Committee of Experts agreed that mechanisms like mandatory
consultations should employ assemblies to decide cases based on panel reports).
108.

WIPO's Dispute Resolution Talks Highlight Conflicts with GATT, 4 World Intell.

Prop. Rep. (BNA) 78, 78 (1990).
109. Protocol to the Berne Convention, supra note 96.
110. See Susan Wagner, WIPO Gets Ready to Tackle Important Copyright Issues

in Berne Protocol, 5 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 277, 278-79 (1991) (outlining
the various copyright issues that will be addressed in the proposed protocol to the
Berne Convention).
111. See Committee of Experts Moves Forward With Model Law on Sound Re-

cordings, 6 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 217, 217 (1992) (reporting WIPO's intention to revise the text of its proposed law which attempts to combat the pirating of
all types of sound recordings).
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broadcasting present questions regarding the enforcement of rights and
the compensation of rights holders which may not be covered by existing agreements. The fact that the United States chose to pursue the
resolution of these issues through WIPO demonstrates that this organization will have an ongoing role in the development of international intellectual property norms and standards after the Uruguay Round. With its
technical expertise in the area of international intellectual property protection, WIPO could be a useful supplement to any action taken as part
of a TRIPS Agreement.
In addition to its role in the TRIPS negotiations, the United States
continues to pursue other avenues for the expansion of international
intellectual property protection. These avenues include NAFTA; treaties
with former communist nations such as the United States-Poland Treaty
Concerning Business and Economic Relations; the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative; and Science and Technology Agreements with such
nations as Brazil and the People's Republic of China."'
An important aspect of NAFTA is its strong intellectual property
section which is modeled after the proposed TRIPS Agreement. As a
result of these negotiations, Mexico, which at one time was a priority
watch nation under" Special 301 due to its weak intellectual property
protection, has taken significant steps to improve its intellectual property
system."' For example, Mexico recently enacted the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property, which, along with companion legislation, has drastically strengthened Mexico's intellectual property
law."' In addition, Mexico promulgated new regulations to liberalize

112. See China-U.S. Intellectual Property Accord Ends Threat of U.S. Retaliatory
Duties, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 139, 139 (Jan. 22, 1992) (reporting that the threat
imposed by Section 301 has resulted in an accord between the United States and the
Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) on intellectual property protection); M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Property Protection in the Americas: The Barriers Are Being
Removed, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2 (Apr. 1992) (outlining various improvements in
intellectual property protection throughout the Americas); Stanislaw Soltysinski, The
Uneasy Development of Intellectual Property Law in Poland, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTs.
2 (May 1992) (noting the improvements in Poland's protection of intellectual property
rights).
113. See ABA Meeting Looks at NAFTA and Intellectual Property Rights, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 724, 724 (Apr. 22, 1992) (remarking on the improvements made
by Mexico with respect to its legal protection of intellectual property rights).
114. See John B. McKnight & Carlos Muggenburg R.V., Mexico's New Intellectual
Property Regime: Improvements in the Protection of Industrial Property, Copyright,
License, and Franchise Rights in Mexico, 27 INT'L LAW. 27, 27-28 (1993) (acknowledging the changes to the domestic law that have been implemented by the Mexican
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its Transfer of Technology Law."' The levels of protection negotiated
under NAFTA further strengthen this intellectual property regime.
Mexico's acceptance of this regime provides a valuable example for
other developing nations and its success could be a catalyst for gaining
further acceptance of international intellectual property protection by
other developing countries.
NAFTA's intellectual property provisions were praised as an improvement on the proposed TRIPS Agreement. These improvements include
broader national treatment obligations; more explicit and effective computer software, database and sound recording protection; pipeline protection for pharmaceuticals and agrichemicals; limitations on dependent
patent compulsory licenses; and the immediate entry into force of the
intellectual property provisions." 6 Furthermore, the provisions require
Canada to eliminate its compulsory licensing system for
pharmaceuticals." 7
The primary weakness of NAFTA's intellectual property provisions
does not relate to Mexico, but to the extension of Canada's Cultural
Industries exclusion under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. This exclusion allows Canada to violate its national treatment
obligations and avoid providing minimum standards of protection when
dealing with certain cultural industries."' The United States, however,
retains the right to "take measures of equivalent commercial effect" in
response to actions taken by Canada under this exclusion."' In spite of
this problem and other weaknesses such as the failure to provide patent
protection to various biotechnology products, NAFTA's intellectual property provisions offer strong protection for intellectual property and constitute an improvement over the proposed TRIPS Agreement. The United
States Congress has already used the NAFTA to speed up the continued
reform of Mexico's intellectual property system. 20 The progress made

Government).
115. Id.
116. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 2-3 (outlining the key changes that will be
achieved as a result of NAFTA).
117. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 3 (noting the changes made to Canada's pharmaceutical licensing regime as a result of NAFTA).
118. See IFAC-3, supra note 59, at 2 (voicing disapproval that N.AFTA does not
affect Canada's ability to discriminate against U.S. companies involved in "cultural
industries").
119. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, art. 2005, Jan. 2, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 281, 396.
120. See Todd Robberson, Mexico Scrambles to Answer U.S. Critics: Congressio-
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in the NAFTA negotiations as well as in other bilateral fora demonstrates the value of regional and bilateral negotiations along side of a
multilateral international intellectual property regime. The improvements
made in NAFTA's intellectual property provisions should provide a basis
for the United States to seek the eventual inclusion of the provisions in
a TRIPS Agreement.
Another alternative mechanism the United States possesses for the
establishment of international intellectual property protection is "Special
301." Special 301 is quite controversial because it uses access to the
U.S. markets as a lever. Accordingly, the United States has been accused of impeding the TRIPS negotiations and has been criticized by the
GATT Director-General for its use of Special 301." Others, however,
note Special 301's success in obtaining higher levels of intellectual
property protection in the trading partners of the United States and
credit Special 301 for providing leverage to U.S. negotiators, stimulating
the TRIPS negotiations, and increasing the prospects for an acceptable
TRIPS Agreement."
For example, after negotiations initiated under
Special 301, Brazil agreed to the immediate implementation of the
TRIPS provisions without regard to the transition period permitted developing nations.2 3 The success of Special 301 makes it a valuable,
albeit controversial, instrument which can encourage other nations to
protect U.S. intellectual property interests.
The controversy surrounding this provision has led to attempts to
weaken mechanisms such as Special 301. As noted above, long transition periods restrict the ability of the United States to use Special 301.
Furthermore, integrated dispute resolution provisions limit Special 301

nal Complaints Draw Prompt Response as Fears Mount for Trade Pact's Fate,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1993, at Al (explaining that the Mexican Government began
enforcing its intellectual property rights more stringently after facing the threat that
the United States Congress might refuse to pass NAFTA).
121. See GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. Section 301, Urges Strong Commitment to
Uruguay Round, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 766, 766 (May 30. 1990) (reporting that
the Director-General of the GATT urged the United States to eliminate its Section
301 process).
122. See, e.g., Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 272-74 (19891990) (explaining the view of the United States that the effects of Section 301 are
consistent with the goals of the GATT process because they serve as incentives for
other countries to undertake significant reforms of their intellectual property regimes).
123. USSR Announces Termination of Brazil Special 301 Investigation, 11 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 344, 344 (Mar. 2, 1994).
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actions under Article 23. The article states that:
Members shall not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Covered Agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules
and procedures of this Understanding... 4
This language requires that a determination of violation or nullification
be reached before any action can be taken. Thus, if an effective dispute
resolution system is negotiated, it is likely that the United States will
make less use of Special 301. Regardless of any treaty limitations, Special 301 could still be used to police compliance with the terms of a
TRIPS Agreement during and after the transition period. Due to its
success in encouraging nations such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand to adopt stronger intellectual property protection, U.S. intellectual
property interests will be loathe to give up Special 301 completely. The
USTR has requested and received submissions from U.S. industries
suggesting that several nations be included on priority, priority watch,
and watch lists. These submissions include many of the nations which
opposed the negotiation and entry into force of a TRIPS Agreement
such as India, Brazil, and, ironically, Uruguay."n Even with the
negotiation of a TRIPS Agreement, Special 301 and the other Section
301 actions play an important -role in drawing attention to inadequate
intellectual property protection and encouraging a rapid resolution of the
problem.
If adopted, the proposed TRIPS Agreement would create a foundation
for the continued development of international intellectual property protection. It must, however, be recognized that any such agreement will
consist of intellectual property law as it is conceived of at the time of
signing. Consequently, there must be a mechanism for adjusting international intellectual property protection to meet the evolving needs of
technology. The TRIPS negotiators included such a mechanism in the
proposed TRIPS Agreement. It must also be recognized that not all
nations will accede to a TRIPS Agreement. The industrialized world,

124. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
GATT Doe. No. MTN/FA H-A2, art. 23.2(a) (1994).
125. See, e.g., Letter from James L. Bikoff, Attorney, Arter & Hadden, to Dorothy'
Balaban, Section 301 Committee, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(Feb. 12, 1993) (filing Special 301 Comments on behalf of Nintendo of America,
Inc., regarding the prevalence of video game piracy in parts of Asia and the Americas).
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therefore, must be prepared to use the GATT along with other avenues
including WIPO, regional and bilateral negotiations, and mechanisms
such as Special 301, to pursue the spread and evolution of international
intellectual property protection. All of these organizations and negotiations have contributed to the advance of intellectual property rights and
helped initiate the negotiation and improvement of the proposed TRIPS
Agreement. International intellectual property protection must be dynamic, therefore, to ensure progress; all avenues of negotiation and mechanisms for the protection of intellectual property rights must be aggressively pursued.
CONCLUSION
The Reagan and Bush Administrations initiated a strong U.S. commitment to the Uruguay Round negotiations. This commitment included
recognizing the role that intellectual property protection will play in
international trade and in the international marketplace. The Clinton
Administration is giving the highest priority to the successful conclusion
of the Uruguay Round negotiations, including the signing and entry into
force of a TRIPS Agreement." 6 It is agreed that the United States is
one of the primary beneficiaries of the agreements coming out of the
Uruguay Round and will receive significant benefit from a TRIPS
Agreement in particular. President Bush made it clear that his Administration preferred pursuing U.S. trade goals in the GATT multilateral
forum. 7 Although there are some differences of opinion on the details, the rest of the industrialized world strongly supports the establishment of a TRIPS Agreement through GATT. Consequently, the question
concerning international intellectual property protection is no longer
whether a TRIPS Agreement will be signed, but when and by whom.
As trade in high technology products and other intellectual property

126. See President-Elect Clinton Seen Pursuing Aggressive Trade Policy To Open
Markets, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1920, 1920 (Nov. 11, 1992) (noting President
Clinton's support of GATT and his desire to pursue a prompt conclusion to the Uruguay Round during his time in office); Testimony of Ambassador Mickey Kantor,
United States Trade Representative, Before the Senate Committee on Finance (March
9. 1993) (on file with The American University Journal of International Law and
Policy) (presenting the intentions of the Clinton Administration with respect to
GATT).
127. See Louis Uchitelle, A Crowbar for Carla Hills, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990,
§ 6, at 20 (reporting on President Bush's desire to pursue U.S. trade goals through
GATT).
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rights-related goods'has grown. intellectual property protection has become an increasingly important trade issue. Inadequate intellectual property protection and the resulting piracy interferes with legitimate trade.
Disparities between the costs of innovation and the costs of pirating can
effectively act as a trade barrier.'2 Developing nations continue to resist establishing a strong intellectual property protection system despite
the studies which illustrate the long term benefits of protective systems
to developing nations' own entrepreneurs, innovators, and economies. 9
The proposed TRIPS Agreement represents the first attempt to balance these concerns, along with other trade considerations addressed in
the Uruguay Round, and to establish an international intellectual property protection regime with relatively comprehensive substantive standards,
mandated enforcement mechanisms, and an effective dispute settlement
system. The multilateral framework is the most efficient and preferred
mechanism for establishing a broadly based system of international intellectual property protection. Due to the continued resistance from nations
with thriving pirate businesses, however, the United States and the other
industrialized nations must consider alternative measures for ensuring the
spread and advance of international intellectual property protection.
Although a TRIPS Agreement will be signed under the auspices of
the GATT, the United States correctly continues to explore other avenues for improved international intellectual property protection. Bilateral
and regional negotiations have achieved many positive results, including
NAFTA's intellectual property provisions, which improve on many of
the elements of the proposed TRIPS Agreement. Some suggest that the
United States should avoid relying excessively on multilateral efforts and
instead focus on bilateral arrangements to achieve its trade objectives. 3 °
In addition, the United States shows no willingness to eliminate Special 301, which is very popular with the U.S. business community due

128. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 298 (1991) (remarking
that the difference between the costs of inventing and producing a good, and that of
merely reproducing a good, can be as effective as a tariff, if not better, at artificially
increasing the price of an imported good).
129. ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990).
130. See Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case For Bilateral
Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 1-3 (1989) (claiming that President Bush relied
too much on multilateral approaches to trade issues and ignores the equally promising
prospects of pursuing bilateral agreements that were successful with Canada).
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to its effectiveness in obtaining substantive results. President Bush demonstrated the commitment of the United States to the multilateral process
in 1990 by not designating any priority foreign countries under Special
301. For 1993, however, the USTR requested and received a wide range
of Special 301 submissions proposing Taiwan, Thailand, and Italy as
priority nations for inadequate copyright protection, as well as India and
Brazil for inadequate patent protection.13 ' The proposed TRIPS Agreement will set a floor for the adequate protection of intellectual property
rights. The United States and the rest of the industrialized world should
remain engaged on a variety of fronts in the pursuit of increased intellectual property protection to continue to develop these rights to cover
new technological achievements and to encourage more reluctant nations
to join a TRIPS Agreement and meet its obligations.
Although the proposed TRIPS Agreement is imperfect, the United
States remains committed to the process of establishing such an agreement under the auspices of the GATT. As the leading exporter of high
technology and other products relying on intellectual property protection,
the United States will benefit greatly from the signing of a TRIPS
Agreement. In pursuing the advancement of international intellectual
property protection, however, the United States need not look exclusively to such an agreement. As stated by the former Director for Intellectual Property at USTR:
[I]f the GATT fails in intellectual property, it does not mean the United
States Government will stop pushing foreign governments to improve their
international intellectual property regimes. It will simply shift to a different emphasis, one which is already ongoing, and may become more
sharply focused, more contentious, and more confrontational than resolving issues through the GAIT. In that context, I want to also say that
there are advantages to resolving issues in the GATT. We prefer
multilateralism. We prefer a regime by which everybody can abide, that
provides discreet and distinct rules about how to proceed to resolve disputes. That is our preference, but it is not necessarily our only option.'32

131. See, e.g., Submission of the PharmaceuticalManufacturers Association; Identification of Priority Foreign Countries, Priority Watch and Watch Countries Under the
Special 301 Provision of the 1988 Trade Act, (as amended) (Feb. 5, 1993) (commenting on the current protection of U.S. copyrights and patents provided by foreign
countries in the pharmaceutical industry); International Intellectual Property Alliance,
Special 301 Recommendations and Estimated Trade Losses Due to Piracy (Feb. 12,
1993) (providing a broad interpretation of the current state of international copyright
and patent protection).
132. Remarks of Mr. Emory Simon, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 367-68
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The proposed TRIPS Agieement, with or without the suggested improvements, marks significant progress in the quest for international intellectual property protection. The results of the Uruguay Round are conceived
of as an integrated package balancing the demands of the industrialized
nations for international intellectual property protection and an improved
dispute resolution system with the interest of developing countries in
achieving an agreement on agricultural and textile issues. At a time
when the United States is aggressively pursuing international intellectual
property protection those nations opposed to a TRIPS Agreement must
consider both the benefits from* these other areas that they risk losing
should they fail to sign, and the consequences of not being covered by
a TRIPS Agreement and its related dispute resolution provisions.
Through the ongoing use of multilateral forums and other mechanisms,
the United States and other industrialized nations should be able to
ensure the acceptance of intellectual property rights in the international
marketplace.

(1989).

